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2Her protocol requires a two-way classical channel between
partners, thus making the overall security dependent on
the security of that channel. In a previous article [12]
some of us proposed a class of quantum authentication
protocols that allow secure authentication of classical bi-
nary messages with one bit as the authentication key.
This improves the eÆciency of classical MACs, that re-
quire, for the authentication of binary messages, at least
two-bit keys. In this paper we adapt this class of proto-
cols to the authentication of quantum messages (qubits),
and study its security. We show that, using the amount of
quantum resources needed to authenticate one-bit classi-
cal messages, the intrinsic nature of quantum information
makes it impossible to detect every unauthorized quan-
tum data manipulation by a potential adversary, thus
making qubit authentication not always possible.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we de-
scribe a general class of one-qubit message authentication
protocols. This class can be seen as a generalization of
the one presented in [12] to authenticate classical binary
messages. In Section III we analyze the security of these
protocols against several attacks. First, we analyze the
no-message attack, in which the sender has not initiated
the transmission (there is no message in the channel), and
Eve attempts to prepare a fake quantum message with
the intention of passing Bob's verication test. Then,
we study more subtle attacks, those in which Eve has
access to what is transmitted. Finally, we present our
conclusions in Section IV.
II. QUANTUM MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
Suppose Alice needs to send a certied quantum mes-
sage to Bob. The goal is to make Bob condent about the
authenticity of the message and sender. For the sake of
simplicity, let us assume that the state to send certied is
an arbitrary qubit described by the density operator 
M
operating on some two-dimensional message space M.
This qubit may be locally generated by her, or she may
be acting as a relay station between two other parties.
In order to certify this message, Alice follows the stan-
dard procedure in classical authentication: She appends
a tag to the message in such a way that the recipient,
Bob, may verify the tag and so convince himself about
the identity of the message originator. The dierence
with respect to the classical case is that now the tag is
also a quantum state, given by the density operator 
T
,
of some tag space T . Therefore, the quantum tagged-








acts on the state space E = M
 T . Since our objective
is to determine whether authentication is possible with
the minimum amount of resources, we shall regard T as
a two-dimensional space. Although this might seem a
strong restriction, it can be shown that having a bigger
tag does not improve the security of the protocol, at least
when dealing with an ideal, error-free quantum channel,
as is the case considered here. In a noisy channel, a big-
ger tag space would certainly be useful in the detection
of errors in the channel that might alter the message, in
the way Quantum Error Correcting Codes (QECC) usu-
ally work. We shall return to this point with more detail
later, at the end of Section III. Finally, since we are inter-
ested in perfect deterministic decoding, valid and invalid
tags must belong, respectively, to orthogonal subspaces
in T , but, since one cannot nd orthogonal mixed states
in a two-dimensional space (T ), 
T






No authentication is possible without a previously
shared secret between the two communicating parties.
This key, which may have been exchanged directly or
by means of a trusted third party (a certication au-
thority), can be a classical or a quantum one. In our
proposal we shall assume that Alice and Bob share a
maximally entangled quantum state as their secret au-
thentication key. For instance, each of the parties could










). It can be argued that, in a real-
istic scenario, dealing with classical keys would be more
advantageous. In fact, our protocol can equally operate
with one-bit classical keys. However, we prefer the use
of quantum keys for their better key-management prop-
erties (no copying of the key remains undetected).
The main dierence between authenticating a classical





is a quantum message, it belongs to the continuous
space of density operators acting onM. Since Alice may
act just as a relay station, we shall assume that 
M
is
unknown to her. In the classical case, there are only two
classical messages to send, `0' or `1'. To encode them un-
ambiguously Alice and Bob need to agree on a particular












can be made openly, adding no more secrecy between the
parties.
According to the notation introduced above, the state
of the global system (key+tagged-message) is given by

ABE














Next Alice performs, on her part of j i
AB
and on the
tagged-message, an encoding operation E
AE
. We may
















is some arbitrary unitary quantum operation
on E . Basically, the action of E
AE
is equivalent to the
selection, triggered by the state of a one-bit key, of one
operator from an arbitrary pair of publicly-known uni-
tary ones. The reason to enforce the unitarity of these
two operators is that it allows Bob to undo their action.
Once this operator is selected, it is applied to 
E
before
sending it through the quantum channel.
If we denote by 
e
ABE
the density operator describ-











, then the state
of the tagged-message that Alice sends to Bob through





















































From this expression, it is easy to obtain the tagged-

















On the reception side, Bob decodes the information

























. Using (3) and (5) in this











. Finally, Bob veries











is the state in T orthogonal to the tag j0i
T
.
If the result of such a measurement is j0i
T
, Bob should
assume that no tampering has taken place, and therefore
extract the quantum message sent to him; otherwise, he
rejects the message received.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the previous section we have claimed that the pro-
posed tag-based quantum authentication protocol pro-
vides perfect deterministic decoding. This means that
the protocol would fail only if Bob accepted a message as
an authenticated one when that is not the case (due to
the unnoticed action of Eve). When dealing with forgery
strategies we must consider two main types of attacks:
The no-message attack, and the message attack [2]. The
rst one is the simpler: Before Alice's sending any mes-
sage to Bob, Eve attempts to prepare a quantum state
that passes the decoding algorithm. The message attack
is more subtle and severe: Eve could access the authen-
tic messages transmitted, and try to produce a forged
message based on the information gained. In the fol-
lowing discussion we shall show how, unlike the case of
authentication of classical messages [12], when dealing
with a one-qubit message it is impossible to select a uni-
tary operation U
E
that makes all Eve's possible attacks
unsuccessful.
A. No-message attack




and sends it to Bob trying to impersonate Alice. When
Bob receives this quantum message he cannot know that
it comes from a forger, so he follows the procedure ex-
plained in the previous section: He performs the decod-
ing operation D
BE





g over the tag space. Before all this takes










. After Bob's decoding,







































. As we have seen, Bob
rejects the message if the result of his orthogonal mea-
surement on T is j1i
T
; therefore, the probability P
f
that





























| and on the quantum operation U
E
. She































In order to check whether Eve succeeds, let us rst






. The conditions (8) and (9) above can































, with j i
M
any pure















should also be satised, where j!i
M
is some pure state
in M.

















, with i; j = 0; 1, act on M. With this





= 0, i.e., the
operator U
01
must be singular. Therefore, if Alice and







< 1 for any pure state prepared by
Eve.








































is used in (8) and (9), these equations are trans-
formed into a problem equivalent to the one posed by
equations (10) and (11). Therefore, also in this more
general case we can assure the result P
f
< 1. In fact, we





can be made at most 1=2. As we have seen, P
f





























































+ P is a positive operator known to






is any eigenvector corresponding to

max




=2. Finally, it is easy to see
(see, e.g., [13]) that choosing U
E
such that it takes P to
its orthogonal complement makes 
max





This is a more subtle and severe family of attacks. In-
stead of directly forging a quantum message and send it
to Bob, Eve could wait for Alice's message and manipu-
late it. Proceeding this way she tries to convert authen-
tic messages into others with high probability of passing
Bob's test.
In order to simplify the analysis, and without loss of
generality, we shall distinguish between two types of mes-
sage attacks. In the rst one, Eve tries to extract infor-
mation, by means of the appropriate measurement of the
message in the channel, that allows her to prepare a dif-
ferent message that Bob regards as authentic. In the sec-
ond class of attacks, Eve does not care about the current
message in the channel. Instead, based on the knowledge
of all the public aspects of the quantum authentication
scheme used, she determines a quantum operation and
applies it to any data sent by Alice. This quantum oper-
ation can be described by a trace-preserving completely-
positive (TPCP) map.
1. Measurement
According to equation (4), the information to which























Since Eve knows how the protocol works, she could get
information about the key if, performing the appropri-
ate measurement on the channel, she could perfectly dis-
tinguish between the two terms on the right-hand side
of (16). If Eve managed to achieve it, she would col-
lapse the state of Alice and Bob shared-key in a known
unentangled pure quantum state, so she could throw
away the authentic message and prepare and send to
Bob a new one that would pass his test. Because Eve
does not know which quantum message, 
M
, has been
sent, the only way to discern between the two terms
is by means of their tag-portions. Therefore, in or-



































Making use of the spectral decomposition of 
M
(see our
reasoning in Section IIIA), the requirement above can be




































some state in M. Following a procedure parallel to the
one employed in Section IIIA, we obtain the requirement
that U
00
must be singular. Therefore, if Alice and Bob





cannot infer from her measurement the necessary infor-
mation about the key.
2. TPCP map
Consider that Alice sends to Bob a quantum tagged-
message 
E
. If no eavesdropping takes place, the state
in the channel is given by (4). But, assume now that
5Eve has the power to perform an arbitrary TPCP map,
$, on the tagged-message sent. Eve wants to choose $
such that the decoding procedure performed by Bob on
the resulting state led to any state not equal to 
M
while
the tag remains in the state j0i
T
.
The global state resulting from Bob's decoding





































































. Clearly, this probabil-






































must be simultaneously satised. In order to check
whether Eve succeeds, let us rst consider the most sim-
ple case of TPCP, that in which she performs a unitary
operation A
E
. Using again the spectral decomposition
of 
M
(see, again, our reasoning in Section IIIA), the















































it is straightforward to see that, in order to fulll (22) and





























, i = 0; 1, are some unitary opera-














, we can arrange equations (24) and












































According to our formulation of the problem, Eve would
succeed in her attack if, given the unitary operator U
E
,



















(Eve does not modify the state of the
tagged-message) is discarded.
In Section IIIA we have shown that Alice and Bob
can avoid Eve's forgering of messages if U
01
is nonsingu-
lar. In a similar way, in Section III B 1 we have seen that
Alice and Bob can prevent Eve from gaining critical in-
formation about the key by way of measurement if U
00
is
also nonsingular. If we assume now that these conditions




are nonsingular, then it can






are then also nonsingular. Under these conditions, as we









ways (for any U
E
) the prescripted solution, and Eve can
always be successful in her attack. This unconditional
success of Eve's attack makes unnecessary to consider
the more general case of a TPCP map.
C. Discussion on the structure of the tag space
Let us now briey explain why increasing the dimen-
sion of the tag space does not aect any of the arguments
considered in this section.
As seen by Eve, the key shared by Alice and Bob
controls whether the quantum state in the channel be-






















)g, so there are two alter-
native coding subspaces for the valid quantum messages.
All the conditions the unitary operator U
E
has to fulll
in order to avoid Eve's attacks can be geometrically in-
terpreted as conditions on the relative position between
these two code subspaces of the four-dimensional space
E . For instance, in order to avoid the success of the no-
message attack, as stated by the conditions (8)-(9), the
subspaces must span E . On the other hand, in order to
avoid the measurement attack, condition (17), both sub-
spaces must be non-orthogonal. As for the unitary at-
tack, we have seen that Eve can always fulll conditions
(24)-(25), i.e. she can always nd a unitary operator act-
ing on E such that it leaves invariant both subspaces at
the same time, independently of their relative position,
and rotate the vectors within in a non trivial way.
If the dimension of T is increased, the dimension of
the space E also increases (say to N , with N > 4),
but if the valid tag state is still some particular state
j0i
T
 j0   0i
T
, the dimension of the two alternative
code subspaces will remain equal to two. Thus we are
just embedding the problem in a larger Hilbert space, but
not changing its intrinsic complexity: In a N -dimensional
Hilbert space Alice and Bob would still be able to choose
two two-dimensional code subspaces neither linearly de-
pendent nor orthogonal, and Eve would still nd a uni-
tary nontrivial operator in U (N ) whose restriction to
the particular four-dimensional space containing the two
codes leaves both codes invariant.
One may also consider what would happen if we al-
6lowed the tag state 
T
to be a mixed rather than a pure
state. According to our protocol, in order to have per-
fect deterministic decoding, the tag should belong to any
subspace of the tag space (so that Alice an Bob could
perfectly distinguish between valid or invalid messages).
When measuring a mixed state one can obtain any state
belonging to the subspace the mixed state has support
on (with a certain probability, given by the spectral de-
composition). Consequently, when Bob veries the tag,
he will consider as valid any result giving a state inside
that subspace, and will discard the message if the result
lays in the orthogonal complement. Things are slightly
more complicated when the tag is not pure because the
dimension of the two distinct code subspaces increases.
The generalization of conditions (8)-(9)-(17) to this case
can be obtained, producing similar restrictions on U
E
.
But the crucial fact is that Eve can still fulll conditions
(24)-(25), i.e., there is always a nontrivial unitary oper-
ator leaving invariant the two code subspaces.
The fact that increasing the dimension of T does not
improve the robustness of the protocol may surprise the
reader familiar with Quantum Error Correction Codes
(QECC). In these codes more qubits of tag are added to
protect against more errors. But note that the nature of
the errors considered is statistical, i.e. they are randomly
generated by the noise in the channel. In QECC the eÆ-
ciency of the correction capability lays on the assumption
that statistical errors on a large number of qubits are less
likely than those on a small number. The errors consid-
ered here, arbitrary unitary actions on the space E , do
not belong to this category.
IV. CONCLUSION
Providing message authentication is one of the main
goals of communication security. Classical message-
authentication methods can be combined with quantum
teleportation to make the authentication of quantum in-
formation possible. However, it is not yet clear whether
this procedure is optimal in the resources it requires. In
this paper we study the authentication of elementary
quantum messages (qubits) using minimum-size keys.
Specically, we have generalized a previous class of quan-
tum authentication protocols [12] to the case of one-qubit
messages, and studied its security against a forger with
quantum power and full access to the channel between
the communicating parties. The main result of this study
is that, unlike classical binary messages, the intrinsic na-
ture of quantum informationmakes the authentication of
one qubit using a minimal key impossible.
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APPENDIX A
In this appendix we show that, given a unitary op-
erator U
E
, acting on a four-dimensional Hilbert space
E =M
T , and with the 2 2 blocks of its matrix rep-
resentation nonsingular, one (Eve) can always nd two















The explicit expressions for the operators in their block






















































































Since all the U
ij
blocks are invertible, we have the fol-

















































































following relation between the U
ij
blocks, derived from


























, so G is hermitian,
and, therefore, A
00
and G commute. Any hermitian op-
erator commutes with some unitary operator that is not




, we can obtain A
11
from (A6). Now it
remains to be shown that such A
11
is also unitary. Com-
puting the adjoint of the rst expression in (A6) and















































. Applying this result to











































































. Their unitarity is proven in a similar
way.
